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The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and  
the Role of Retaliation in Filings 
 








Over the past decade, the world-wide use of antidumping has become very 
widespread – 41 WTO-member countries initiated antidumping cases over the 1995-2003 
period.   From another perspective, US exporters were subjected to 139 antidumping 
cases during this period, by enforcement agencies representing 20 countries.  In this 
context, it is natural to consider whether antidumping filings may be motivated as 
retaliation against similar measures imposed on a country’s exporters.  This is the focus 
of our study, though we also control for the bilateral export flows involved and non-
retaliatory impacts of past cases, with other motivations – macroeconomic, industry-
specific and political considerations – dealt with through industry, country and year fixed 
effects.  Applying probit analysis to a WTO database on reported filings, we find strong 
evidence that retaliation was a significant motive in explaining the rise of antidumping 
filings over the past decade, though interesting differences emerge in the reactions to 
traditional and new users of antidumping.   2 
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I.  Introduction and Previous Literature 
While business news in the developed world tends to emphasize trade policy 
enforcement by the two large economic powers, the EU and United States, the use of 
antidumping has become very widespread – 39 other WTO-member countries (and 
possibly other non-members) initiated antidumping cases over the 1995-2003 period.   
From another perspective, U.S. exporters were subjected to 139 antidumping cases during 
this period, by enforcement agencies representing 20 countries (the EU regarded for these 
purposes as a single country).  In this context, it is natural to consider whether 
antidumping filings may be motivated as retaliation against similar measures imposed on 
a country’s exporters.  This is the focus of our study, though we also control for the 
bilateral export flows involved and non-retaliatory impacts of past cases, dealing with 
other motivations – macroeconomic, industry, and political considerations -- through 
industry, country and year fixed effects.
1 
 
  Antidumping duties are allowed under WTO rules when there is injury or 
threatened injury to a competing domestic industry from sales by an exporter made at 
unfairly low prices (usually prices below those charged in the home market, but 
sometimes below costs).   Each country establishes its own antidumping enforcement 
mechanism, and case filings are brought by domestic companies to their respective 
                                                 
1 There is a large literature explaining antidumping filings by these industry-specific, political, and 
macroeconomic factors, starting with Finger (1981), and including work by Feinberg and Hirsch (1989),  
Knetter and Prusa (2003), and Aggarwal (2004).  For an excellent survey see Blonigen and Prusa (2003).   3 
government enforcement agencies.  In recent years the lines between this form of 
“administrative protection” and other forms of trade restrictions have been blurred – at 
least in the views of many observers.  Therefore, in studying motivations for filing 
antidumping petitions researchers have turned to considering not just case-specific factors, 
but also more general determinants of the demand and supply for protection against 




But given the obvious spread of antidumping enforcement, economists have 
begun to consider the issue of retaliation in antidumping filings and the increasing 
globalization of this instrument of trade policy.  Miranda et al (1998) and CBO (1998) 
were the first to document the dramatic growth in the number of countries joining the 
“antidumping club.” Miranda et al. suggest that if the emergence of increased 
antidumping enforcement by developing countries was a quid pro quo for general trade 
liberalization, there may be welfare gains from this proliferation of antidumping filings, 
at least in a second-best sense.  The CBO paper acknowledges this possibility as well, 
though their focus is more on whether U.S. exporters have been harmed by and/or singled 
out for retaliation by new users of antidumping; on these latter issues they suggest 
minimal impact to that point, noting however that with continued growth in antidumping 
by developing countries U.S. exporters may begin to be more affected in the future. 
 
                                                 
2 Papers by Prusa (1992) and Staiger and Wolak (1994) discuss strategic motivations for filings from a 
somewhat different perspective than the more recent work discussed below.  Their emphasis was on 
antidumping as a mechanism to promote tacit collusion between domestic and foreign firms on the 
price/quantity dimension, rather than focusing on the interdependencies between antidumping enforcement 
policies in different countries.   4 
Lindsay and Ikenson (2001) highlight the growing threat to U.S. interests posed 
by new antidumping users.  They view these new users as following the “bad U.S. 
example” of protecting domestic industries from foreign competition under the banner of 
antidumping, agreeing with earlier authors that developing countries have been 
increasing the use of antidumping in part as an offset to lower negotiated tariffs.  Prusa 
(2001) focuses in his analysis on the impact of U.S. antidumping on trade flows, but also 
discusses the data on the spread of antidumping enforcement in the developing world.  In 
the latter context, he briefly discusses the strategic issues involved in a government’s 
decision to adopt an antidumping policy – on the one hand, actions may be aimed at 
deterring other users of antidumping, but on the other hand, this deterrence may fail with 
the result a prisoner’s dilemma with retaliation occurring instead.  Prusa and Skeath 
(2002) more fully develop this point, finding evidence consistent with strategic 
motivations behind antidumping filings. 
 
More recent work, and closest to the focus of our empirical work below, is that by 
Blonigen and Bown (2003), Francois and Niels (2004), and Prusa and Skeath (2004).  
Blonigen and Bown develop a trigger price model, based on the reciprocal dumping 
framework, which allows for the threat of an antidumping action against a country to 
restrain that country’s own antidumping activity, and find some evidence consistent with 
this prediction for the United States.  Francois and Niels (2004) suggest that new users 
may be initiating antidumping actions to retaliate against countries taking antidumping 
action against their exports.  They find that Mexican antidumping petitions were three-  5 
times more likely to be successful when filed against countries that had initiated a case 
against Mexican exports in the previous year.   
 
  Prusa and Skeath (2004) address some of the issues considered in this paper, 
though their dataset covers an earlier period, 1980-1998, most of which was dominated 
by traditional users of antidumping.  Their stated focus is to explore whether the increase 
in global use of antidumping was solely due to increased “unfair trading” – and they (not 
surprisingly – to anyone who has studied the subject) reject this hypothesis.  They find 
that antidumping users are more likely to target other users of antidumping than those 
without such enforcement, and that countries are more likely to target exporting countries 
with a past history of bringing cases against them.  The latter result Prusa and Skeath 
interpret as retaliation or tit-for-tat, but one would not generally view a 1995 case by 
India against the EU following an EU case against India 10 years, or even 3 years, earlier 
as strategic behavior; most game theoretic models suggest an immediacy of response in 
order to use retaliation as a means of establishing credibility of threat, or as an effective 
tit-for-tat mechanism. 
 
Our analysis extends the previous work by examining not merely the impact of 
threatened retaliation, but the actual patterns of retaliation which seem to have emerged 
over the past decade in the industry/country-target-specific antidumping actions of 41 
countries.  We attempt in our analysis to capture both retaliation motivations expanding 
the use of antidumping and possible threat impacts which may lessen this somewhat.  We 
also allow for the possibility, as noted in a recent working paper by Bown and Crowley   6 
(2004), that past antidumping cases – through their trade-distorting effects, or what they 
refer to as “trade deflection” – can influence the use of import protection of all types, 
including antidumping. 
 
II.  Empirical and Theoretical Motivation 
Before discussing theoretical issues, it is instructive to examine the patterns of the 
global spread of antidumping, both in terms of cases brought, and number of active 
national enforcement agencies involved.  Looking at Table 1, it may be surprising to 
some to see that the leading user of antidumping since 1995 has been India, with 
Argentina and South Africa among the top five.  Turning to Figures 1 and 2, the same 
story is told from a different perspective.  We see there that while there has been a 
significant increase in the number of antidumping cases brought world-wide, a more 
dramatic increase has occurred in the number of countries getting involved in bringing 
such cases, roughly a tripling of non-casual enforcers (defined as more than 2 cases 
brought in a year) between the late 1980s and today, with all of this growth brought about 
by new enforcement agencies in developing economies. 
 
To motivate our empirical analysis, consider a model (built on Brander and 
Krugman (1983)) discussed in the Appendix to Blonigen and Bown (2003).  There are 
two quantity-setting firms, one from each of two countries, competing in the two markets 
(segmented by transport costs).  Antidumping filings impose a duty t, with a probability 
of success f , requiring a fixed cost K.  The probability of success is an increasing 
function of the foreign firm’s quantity share of the domestic market.  Blonigen and Bown   7 
then consider an infinitely repeated game – with 2 stages in each period – involving the 
choice of quantities and then the independent decision of each firm to file an antidumping 
petition or not.  Using the trigger strategy to achieve the cooperative outcome of no 
antidumping filings (with the threat of antidumping infinitely into the future if the rival 
defects), they find the avoidance of antidumping is supported by sufficiently high 
punishment costs from the rival’s antidumping actions. 
 
However, if these threatened costs are relatively low (or non-existent in the case 
of a rival without an antidumping enforcement apparatus), the filing of antidumping cases 
becomes more likely.  Furthermore, cost disadvantages by the domestic firm increases 
their gains from antidumping and the likelihood of a prisoners dilemma result of 
antidumping by both countries.  Not surprisingly for models of this sort, equilibrium 
outcomes are quite sensitive to the parameters of the model, and we can find the impact 
of both actual and threatened antidumping by one country against another to provoke 
either retaliation or deterrence.  From an empirical perspective, it may be true both that 
in equilibrium the increased threat of antidumping by a rival leads to deterrence and that 
over the period we study a disequilibrium unraveling of retaliation may have occurred. 
 
In what follows we examine the pattern of antidumping filings by particular 
industries in particular countries against particular target countries in response to past 
antidumping actions against that particular industry as well as more generally against the 
country more broadly.  We also consider the role of threat, revealed through the target 
country’s recent antidumping activity globally.  Of course there are other motivations for   8 
filing antidumping cases, and we control for macroeconomic, industry-specific and 
political factors via fixed effects, as well as dealing with the concern (presented in Bown 
and Crowley (2004)) that “trade deflection” caused by third-party antidumping may 
induce new antidumping filings. 
 
III.  Empirical Analysis 
We have obtained WTO data from all member countries on their antidumping 
filings during 1995-2003 by target country and industry category (20 HS sections of 
which 19 were involved in at least one filing over this period).  Counting the EU as one 
country, there were 41 importing countries filing at least one antidumping case against 83  
exporting countries.
3  Limiting our analysis to the years 1996-2003, so we can observe a 
one-year lag in filings, we have 511,024 importing country/exporting country/industry 
sector/year observations as to whether an antidumping case was filed or not.  Petitions  
were filed in 1,752 (or 0.34 percent) of these observations.   
 
We seek to explain this filing decision using fixed-effects in a probit binary 
choice model, with the primary explanatory variables of interest those that will determine 
whether the filing decision is motivated by the urge to retaliate against certain trading 
partners.
4  We include a dummy variable that indicates whether the exporting country 
                                                 
3 Because members are the only countries required to report their filings to the WTO, our dataset may 
underestimate the number of petitions filed by new WTO members prior to joining, notably Taiwan who 
used its antidumping law extensively in the earlier period.  See Zanardi (2004) for more information about 
antidumping use by non-WTO members.  Our results were virtually unchanged when Taiwan was excluded 
from the sample. 
4 Some studies suggest that the probit model does not lend itself well to fixed effects because the parameter 
estimates are biased and inconsistent when the length of the panel is small and fixed (the “incidental 
parameter problem”).  Greene (2003) found that although the upward bias is persistent, it drops off 
dramatically as the number of time periods increases beyond 3.  He concludes that a fixed-effects model   9 
filed an antidumping case against the importing country and industry category during the 
past year (CAT).   
 
Unfortunately, the industry categories by which our data are organized, HS 
sections, are too broad for us to be certain that the same firms are involved in a bilateral 
exchange of cases between two countries in successive years, which would be the 
conventional notion of retaliation by firms involved.  However, anecdotally, this does 
seem to occur; e.g., a 2001 antidumping case brought by Canada against India in hot-
rolled sheet was followed by a 2002 case by India against Canada in hot-rolled 
coils/sheets/strips/plates.  Similarly a 2001 antidumping case filed by the US against EU 
members in cold-rolled carbon steel flat products was followed in 2002 by an EU case 
filed against the US in that same narrowly-defined product. 
 
But in general it is likely that a case against an industry category in a particular 
country the previous year involved a different group of firms than the subsequent case 
within the same industry category.  This may be retaliation, but the mechanism through 
which it derives is less clear.  Especially in a small country there may be close business 
links between companies in different narrow product lines within the same broad 
category, and they may also be linked through unions, trade associations, or law firms in 
common.  In addition, retaliation may in part be reflected at the country-level -- the 
government agency charged with enforcing antidumping statutes may be more likely to 
make an affirmative determination and impose larger dumping margins against those 
                                                                                                                                                 
may be preferred if the alternative is a misspecified random effects model or a pooled estimator which 
neglects the cross-unit heterogeneity.   10 
exporting countries that filed cases against the importing country in the previous year.
5  If 
so, firms will anticipate higher expected benefits from filing cases against these countries, 
and will thus be more likely to file antidumping petitions against them.  
 
To expand on the latter point, we also consider whether the exporting country 
filed a case against any other industry in the importing country in the past year (OTHER).  
Because broad industry categories may cause the CAT and OTHER variable to both pick 
up retaliation on the country level, in other specifications we instead include a single 
variable that indicates whether the exporting country filed at least one case against the 
importing country in the previous year (RETALIATION).   
 
As a measure of the potential threat from the exporting country’s own 
antidumping enforcement, we include the exporting country’s total world-wide filings the 
previous year (ALL).  If countries are deterred from filing cases against those exporting 
countries with a reputation for using antidumping enforcement, we would expect this 
variable to have a negative estimated coefficient.   
 
Several control variables are included as well.  The likelihood of filing a case 
clearly should depend on the volume of imports from the potential target, so we also 
include bilateral imports at the broad HS section level (IMPORTS) in the estimating 
                                                 
5 Some recent empirical evidence supports this view.  As noted above, Francois and Niels (2004) found that 
Mexican antidumping petitions were more likely to be successful when filed against countries that had 
initiated a case against Mexican exports in the previous year.   11 
equation.
6  In addition, Bown and Crowley (2004) have discussed the role the spread of 
antidumping has played in “trade deflection” – cases filed against one country may divert 
its trade flows elsewhere leading to more import protection being sought by third 
countries, including antidumping filings.  We therefore include a variable 
(DEFLECTION) which equals the number of global antidumping cases filed the previous 
year in the particular industry category, excluding those filed against the importer being 
considered. 
 
In order to control for unobserved macroeconomic, political, and industry factors 
we use year, industry category and importing country fixed effects in all specifications.  
We attempt to control for additional exporting country factors by using a dummy variable 
that equals 1 when the exporting country is a “traditional” antidumping user, which 
includes Australia, Canada, the European Union, New Zealand and the United States 
(TRADITIONAL).  In other specifications we add fixed effects for additional non-
traditional users who have been the leading targets of petitions during the sample period:   
China, Korea, Taiwan, India and Indonesia.  
 
  In Table 2 we present our full sample results, where marginal effects on the 
dependent variable (likelihood of filing a case) rather than the actual probit coefficients 
are shown.  A statistically significant positive retaliation effect is found in all three 
specifications, both the direct impact of a case the previous year in the same 2-digit HS 
                                                 
6 These data are obtained from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database.  We use a single 
midsample observation, 1999, for this variable as consistent data were not available for all years in our 
sample and our primary rationale for including this variable was to capture cross-sectional variation.  As 
noted below, we also present results excluding observations for which bilateral imports were zero, as 
clearly no antidumping case will be filed where domestic producers feel no pressure from imports.   12 
sector (CAT) and the more indirect impact of a case filed the previous year against a 
different industry sector of the country (OTHER).  These two effects are quite similar 
(both increasing the likelihood of filing a case by about 10 percent), suggesting that 
retaliation is often determined at the country level rather than simply by the industries 
directly involved.
7  Countries are also significantly more likely to file petitions against 
heavy users of antidumping laws (ALL); the likelihood of filing a case against a 
particular country increases by approximately 5 percent for every 10 cases the country 
filed in the previous year.  This result seems unlikely to be explained by retaliation; 
moreover, if antidumping filings successfully deter future cases the impact would be 
negative.   
 
The volume of industry imports from the exporting country (IMPORTS) is, as 
expected, an important determinant in the decision to file an antidumping case. Our 
results suggest that a $1 billion increase in the sectoral volume of imports from the 
targeted country results in a 0.5 to 1 percent increase in the likelihood of filing an AD 
case.   Countries are slightly more likely to file petitions when there has been significant 
antidumping activity in the industry – elsewhere in the world -- in the previous year 
(DEFLECT); this result is consistent with the view that antidumping cases deflect trade 
to third countries, thus increasing the likelihood that these third countries will seek some 
form of protection.    
 
                                                 
7 The similarity of effects may also suggest that our industry classifications are too broad to effectively 
capture true retaliation by the same parties targeted by a past antidumping case.   13 
  None of these results seem to be driven by any particular industry or correlation 
with unobserved exporting country effects; results do not change when we allow for 
differential retaliation effects in the leading user industry (metals), nor do they change 
when we control for cases against traditional users of antidumping laws and the leading 
targets of antidumping petitions.  In fact, the average retaliation effect associated with a 
case filed in the same industry sector is nearly three-times higher when we allow this 
result to differ in the metals industry because the metals industry is less likely to retaliate 
against a case filed against it than other industry sectors.  In contrast, the results suggest 
that cases are more likely to be filed in the metals industry to retaliate against a case filed 
in the previous year against some other industry.   
 
  Cases do seem more likely to be brought against traditional users of antidumping, 
which could be interpreted as a type of retaliation for past cases.  While the magnitudes 
of the marginal effects are smaller when we control for the leading non-traditional targets 
of antidumping actions presented in column 3, the effects of CAT, OTHER, ALL, 
IMPORTS, and DEFLECTION continue to be positive and significant. 
 
The large marginal effects associated with exporters China, India, Korea, Taiwan, 
and Indonesia, suggest that highly competitive, low-cost countries such as these are 
targeted more often than predicted by our other variables.  Marginal effects associated 
with the importing country fixed effects, as presented in Table 3, confirm the summary 
statistics described above; while traditional users continue to be heavy users of 
antidumping, non-traditional users such as India and Argentina have grown in importance.    14 
The industry fixed effects show that on average more antidumping petitions are filed in 
the Base Metals and Plastic & Rubber industries than any others. 
 
   Because it is likely that both CAT and OTHER are capturing retaliation on a 
country-level rather than on a narrowly-defined industry basis, in Table 4 we combine the 
two effects into a single variable, RETALIATION.  The results are similar to those found 
in Table 2.  The retaliation variable is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
the likelihood of a country filing a case is about 10 percent higher against those countries 
that targeted it in the previous year.  There is no indication that the metals industry 
retaliates more than other industries, reflecting the results above that while the metals 
industry is less likely to retaliate against same-industry cases it is more likely to be used 
to retaliate against cases filed against other industries.  Estimates associated with other 
variables, including DEFLECT and ALL, are virtually identical to those discussed in 
Table 2. 
 
  In Table 5, we create several sub-samples for analysis.  We examine separately 
the filing decision by traditional users and new users, both against all countries and those 
filed only against traditional users.  The results from these sub-samples are quite different.  
When we consider cases brought by either traditional users or new users against all 
countries, the retaliation effect continues to be positive and significant.  When we 
consider cases brought by traditional and new users against just traditional users, the 
retaliation effect is no longer statistically significant, although there is still a greater 
likelihood of filing against heavier users of antidumping.  This suggests that while both   15 
new and users believe they may be able to deter future antidumping actions by new users 
through retaliation, all countries view traditional users as firmly entrenched in the 
antidumping “club.”  Therefore, little can be gained from retaliating against these 
countries.   
 
  The sub-sample results confirm that countries are more likely to file against heavy 
users of antidumping (ALL), while new users target traditional members of the 
antidumping club more often (TRADITIONAL) even after controlling for the level of 
antidumping use by these countries.  The estimates associated with the trade deflection 
impact vary differ across sub-samples.  Traditional users seem to be somewhat more 
likely to file against new users in order to protect themselves from deflected trade, while 
new users are more likely to file against traditional users to protect themselves from trade 
surges that occur due to increased antidumping activity.  This result undoubtedly reflects 
differing trade patterns between the two groups of users. 
 
  One limitation of the sample we have been analyzing to this point is that many of 
the observations are characterized by no bilateral import flows, and for these observations 
there is no reason to expect an antidumping filing.  In Table 6, we replicate the probit 
specification reported in Table 4 on a more limited sample, one that excludes zero 
bilateral import observations.
8  The estimated magnitude of the retaliation effect remains 
                                                 
8 We also replicated the results of Table 2 and 5, with a similar outcome.  In addition, we considered two 
smaller samples, one of which includes only exporters with active antidumping enforcement agencies and a 
second which includes only those industry categories in which more than 50 cases were filed during the 
sample period.  Results from both sub-samples are similar to those reported here.  In focusing our attention 
on the fuller sample we are likely to be conservative in our estimates of the retaliation effect (as cases 
against non-users of antidumping obviously cannot be explained by retaliation).   16 
statistically significant using this sub sample; countries are 5 to 15 percent more likely to 
file a case against a country that targeted it in the previous year.  Other results are 
unchanged from earlier specifications; ALL, IMPORTS, DEFLECT and TRADITIONAL 
are positive and significant with approximately the same magnitudes as those reported 
earlier. 
 
  Except when we limit our analysis to cases against traditional users of 
antidumping, we find strong support for a retaliation motive in filing antidumping 
petitions.  No support is found for a deterrent effect, though we cannot reject that as a 
possibility.  Note that deterrence in the Blonigen/Bown model, as in the standard trigger 
price result, is an equilibrium concept.  There is no reason to think that the period we are 
observing – looking again at the explosion of active antidumping enforcers around the 
world during the late 1990s – represents an equilibrium in which deterrence may be 
supported.  It may well be that we now are or soon will be in such an equilibrium; a 




 IV. Conclusion 
 
In recent years many observers have begun to note the proliferation of 
antidumping regimes and the possibility that established users of this trade policy 
instrument are being retaliated against.  Others have suggested that at some point (if not 
quite yet) an equilibrium could be reached in which the threat of antidumping provides a 
deterrent to further cases.  In this paper we have used a unique WTO dataset to provide   17 
the strongest evidence to date that a significant share of antidumping filings worldwide 
can be interpreted as retaliation. 
 
This is not to say that macroeconomic, political, and industry-specific factors are 
not important – of course they are.  But even after controlling for these determinants 
(largely through fixed effects) and for trade-related rationales for filings, we have shown 
that retaliation clearly plays a role.  This suggests, among other things, that industries 
considering bringing an antidumping petition may wish to add in to their calculations the 
possible costs to their exports of future antidumping cases against them. 
 
  We have used the term “retaliation” throughout this paper – is it possible that 
what we are observing is simply “learning”?  The theoretical motivations are quite 
different; retaliation is motivated by the need to maintain credibility in attempting to 
deter future antidumping (or part of a disequilibrium movement to the prisoners dilemma 
outcome), while learning simply reflects a changed awareness of the relative costs and 
benefits of bringing a case.  It seems unlikely that learning how to file antidumping cases 
(or to create an antidumping authority) requires that a prior case be brought against the 
country (or that country A learns of the wisdom of filing against country B only when 
country B has filed against A the year before).  Our empirical results seem more 
consistent with some variant of retaliation, though future research should try to 
disentangle these motivations.   18 
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Table 1 
Antidumping Cases Filed by 15 Leading Users 1995-2003 
 
India  379 
United States  329 
European Union  274 
Argentina  180 
South Africa  166 
Australia  163 
Canada  122 
Brazil  109 
Mexico  73 
China  72 
Turkey  61 
Korea  59 
Indonesia  54 
Peru  48 
New Zealand   42 
 
     
Source:  WTO website and Miranda et al (1998)   21 
Table 2 
Marginal Effects of Types of Retaliation on Probability of Filing a Petition 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CAT  0.000340*  0.000323*  0.000131*  0.000947* 
  (0.000151)  (0.000147)  (0.000073)  (0.000321) 
CAT*METALS        -0.000297* 
        (0.000033) 
OTHER  0.000330*  0.000288*  0.000098*  0.000205* 
  (0.000085)  (0.000080)  (0.000037)  (0.000074) 
OTHER*METALS        0.000348* 
        (0.000198) 
ALL  0.000017*  0.000016*  0.000007*  0.000016* 
  (0.000001)  (0.000001)  (0.000001)  (0.000002) 
IMPORTS  0.000039*  0.000037*  0.000017*  0.000037* 
   (in billions)  (0.000005)  (0.000005)  (0.000003)  (0.000005) 






TRADITIONAL    0.000169*  0.000486*  0.000192* 
    (0.000058)  (0.000093)  (0.000061) 
CHINA      0.011232*   
      (0.001281)   
TAIWAN      0.003198*   
      (0.000559)   
INDIA      0.000355*   
      (0.000138)   
INDONESIA      0.002301*   
      (0.000438)   
KOREA      0.004083*   
      (0.000641)   
         
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Category Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Mean Probability  0.00343  0.00343  0.00343  0.00343 
Observations  511,024  511,024  511,024  511,024 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * denotes those marginal effects significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3 
Marginal Effects of Strongest Category and Importing Country Fixed Effects
1 
 
Industry Categories   
Base metals and articles thereof (XV)  0.00404* 
  (0.00096) 
Plastics, rubber and articles thereof  (VII)  0.00202* 
  (0.00046) 
Raw hides, leather, furskins, etc. (VIII)  0.00150* 
  (0.00035) 
Textiles (XI)  0.00083* 
  (0.00023) 
Machinery and Mechanical Appliances (XVI)  0.00066* 
  (0.00021) 
   
Importing Countries  0.00713* 
India  (0.00177) 
  0.00460* 
European Community  (0.00124) 
  0.00452* 
United States  (0.00123) 
  0.00339* 
Australia  (0.00098) 
  0.00326* 
Argentina  (0.00095) 
   
   
Mean Probability  0.00343 
Observations  511,024 
 
1 Selected fixed effect estimates associated with the first specification presented in Table 2.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  * denotes those marginal effects significant at the 1 percent level.   23 
Table 4 
Marginal Effect of Any Retaliation on Probability of Filing a Petition 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RETALIATION  0.000409*  0.000359*  0.000120*  0.000360* 
  (0.000093)  (0.000087)  (0.000040)  (0.000092) 
RETALIATION*        -0.000002 
    METALS        (0.000084) 
ALL  0.000017*  0.000016*  0.000007*  0.000015* 
  (0.000001)  (0.000001)  (9.95x10
-7)  (0.000002) 
IMPORTS  0.000039*  0.000037*  0.000017*  0.000037* 
   (in billions)  (0.000005)  (0.000005)  (0.000003)  (0.000005) 






TRADITIONAL    0.000159*  0.000475*  0.000158* 
    (0.000057)  (0.000092)  (0.000056) 
CHINA      0.011175*   
      (0.001276)   
TAIWAN      0.003177*   
      (0.000556)   
INDIA      0.000354*   
      (0.000136)   
INDONESIA      0.002258*   
      (0.000431)   
KOREA      0.004037*   
      (0.000635)   
         
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Category Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Mean Probability  0.00343  0.00343  0.00343  0.00343 
Observations  511,024  511,024  511,024  511,024 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * denotes those marginal effects significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5 
Marginal Effect of Retaliation on Probability of Filing a Petition: Sub-Samples 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Importing Country  Traditional  New  Traditional  New 
Exporting Country  All  All  Traditional  Traditional 
         
RETALIATION  0.001509*  0.000384*  0.002398  0.000938 
  (0.000732)  (0.000108)  (0.004458)  (0.000609) 
ALL  0.000131*  0.000014*  0.000609*  0.000131* 
  (0.000017)  (0.000001)  (0.000140)  (0.000025) 
IMPORTS  0.000245*  0.000077*  0.000574*  0.000171* 
   (in billions)  (0.000035)  (0.000012)  (0.000201)  (0.000076) 
DEFLECT  0.000033*  8.23x10
-7  0.000181  0.000030* 
  (0.000001)  (8.80x10
-7)  (0.000113)  (0.000015) 
TRADITIONAL  -0.000019  0.000179*     
  (0.000537)  (0.000066)     
         
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Category Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Mean Probability  0.01047  0.00258  0.03320  0.01394 
Observations  62,320  425,088  2,560  16,000 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * denotes those marginal effects significant at the 1 percent level.   25 
 
Table 6 
Marginal Effect of Retaliation on Probability of Filing a Petition
1 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RETALIATION  0.000873*  0.000821*  0.000344*  0.000830* 
  (0.000199)  (0.000195)  (0.000109)  (0.000207) 
RETALIATION*METALS        -0.000030 
        (0.000218) 
ALL  0.000038*  0.000036*  0.000019*  0.000036* 
  (0.000003)  (0.000003)  (0.000003)  (0.000004) 
BILATERAL IMPORTS  0.000105*  0.000010*  0.000054*  0.000010* 
   (in billions)  (0.000018)  (0.000001)  (0.000007)  (0.000001) 
DEFLECT  0.000006*  0.000006*  0.000004*  0.000006* 
  (0.000002)  (0.000002)  (0.000001)  (0.000002) 
TRADITIONAL    0.000194  0.000928*  0.000193 
    0.000119  (0.000179)  0.000119 
CHINA      0.018902*   
      (0.001918)   
TAIWAN      0.005660*   
      (0.000926)   
INDIA      0.000825*   
      (0.000321)   
INDONESIA      0.004029*   
      (0.000746)   
KOREA      0.007313*   
      (0.001056)   
         
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Category Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Mean Probability  0.00581  0.00581  0.00581  0.00581 
Observations  299,640  299,640  299,640  299,640 
 
1 Sample excludes those observations in which imports from the potential target were zero in 1999. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * denotes those marginal effects significant at the 1 percent level. 
 


















Figure 1.  Number of Antidumping Cases Filed Worldwide, 1987-2003
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Figure 2.   Active Antidumping Authorities Worldwide, 1987-2003
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